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Background
The session initiation protocol (SIP) is an application layer controlling protocol for crea-
tion, modification and termination of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) sessions with 
one or more participants. With the rapid growth of VoIP users, SIP is used in both the 
wireless and the wired networks widely. Originally, SIP authentication scheme is derived 
from HTTP digest authentication (Franks et al. 1999), which cannot resist server-spoof-
ing attack and password guessing attack (Yang et  al. 2005). Since then, various user 
authentication schemes for SIP have been proposed.
In 2005, Yang et al. (2005) proposed a new SIP authentication scheme based on Dif-
fie-Hellman key exchange protocol, but Huang and Wei (2006) found that Yang et al.’s 
scheme has high computational costs and proposed an efficient SIP scheme. To improve 
the efficiency, Durlanik and Sogukpinar (2005) and Wu et al. (2009) also proposed SIP 
authentication protocols using the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), respectively. 
Unfortunately, Yang et al.’s and Huang et al.’s schemes suffer from the off-line password 
guessing attack (Jo et al. 2009), while Durlanik et al.’s and Wu et al.’s schemes are vulner-
able to the Denning-Sacco attack and the off-line password guessing attack (Yoon et al. 
2010b). Yoon et  al. (2010b) presented an improved scheme to overcome these weak-
nesses. But Liu and Koenig pointed out that Yoon et al.’s SIP authentication scheme is 
still insecure against the off-line password guessing attack and the insider attack (Liu 
and Koenig 2011). Applying one-way hash function and the fast logic operations like 
exclusive-or, Tsai (2009) proposed a nonce based SIP authentication scheme. Later on, 
Yoon et  al. (2010a) demonstrated that their scheme is vulnerable to Denning-Sacco 
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attack, off-line password guessing attack and stolen-verifier attack, and proposed a new 
SIP authentication scheme. In 2012, Xie (2012) demonstrated that Yoon et al.’s scheme is 
still vulnerable to stolen-verifier attack and off-line password guessing attack, and pro-
posed an improvement of Yoon et al.’s scheme, but Farash and Attari (2013) found that 
Xie’s protocol is also insecure against impersonation attack and off-line password guess-
ing attack, and then they proposed an improved scheme to resolve these problems.
Recently, to enhance the performance and secrecy, Arshad and Ikram (2013) proposed 
an ECC-based SIP authentication protocol in 2013. But Tang and Liu (2013), He et al. 
(2012) and Pu et al. (2013) pointed out that Arshad et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to off-
line password guessing attack. They also developed new schemes to enhance the secu-
rity of Arshad et al.’s scheme. Later, Irshad et al. (2014) demonstrated that Tang et al.’s 
scheme cannot resist the server impersonation attack if an adversary can obtain the 
user’s password, and they proposed an improved protocol using ECC. Recently, Zhang 
et al. (2014) proposed a new password-based SIP authentication protocol, but Tu et al. 
(2015), Irshad et al. (2015) and Wu et al. (2013) showed that Zhang et al.’s protocol is vul-
nerable to the impersonation attack, and they proposed improved protocols respectively. 
After that, Arshad and Nikooghadam (2016) showed that Irshad et  al.’s scheme is still 
vulnerable to impersonation attack. Farash (2016) and Mishra et  al. (2016) found that 
Tu et al.’s protocol cannot resist the impersonation attack, and also presented improved 
schemes. It is worth mentioning that Mishra et al.’s scheme is a three-factor SIP authenti-
cation scheme, but it does not achieve perfect forward secrecy. Very recently, Chaudhry 
et al. (2015b) found that Tu et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to server impersonation attack. 
Moreover, both Tu et al.’s and Farash’s improved schemes cannot protect user’s privacy 
and suffer from replay and denial of services attacks. To enhance the security, they pro-
posed a privacy preserving authentication scheme for SIP. Kumari et al. (2015) argued 
that Farash’s protocol cannot withstand impersonation attack, password guessing attack, 
and session-specific temporary information attack. Further, Kumari et al. proposed an 
improved protocol to fix the weaknesses of Farash’s protocol.
Many of above mentioned session initiation protocols are based on either password or 
both of password and smart card. However, password based protocol may suffer from 
password guessing attack, and smart card based protocol may suffer from smart card 
stolen attack by extracting information stored in smart card, even if the smart card is 
designed for achieving a certain level of tamper resistance (Witteman 2002). In order 
to solve password guessing attack and smart card stolen attack for SIP authentication 
scheme, we use user’s biometrics to protect user’s password and the sensitive informa-
tion in smart card, since user’s biometrics have many advantages, such as it is difficult to 
be fabricated, distributed, lost, forgotten, guessed or copied (Li and Hwang 2010). On 
the other hand, fuzzy extractor can always output the same random string if the input 
biometrics has sufficient similarity to the stored biometrics (Dodis et al. 2004). There-
fore, in this paper, we propose a biometrics-based SIP authentication scheme, and use pi 
calculus (Abadi and Fournet 2001) based formal verification tool ProVerif (Abadi et al. 
2009) to prove authentication and security of the proposed protocol.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In “Biometrics-based SIP authentication 
scheme” section, we propose our Biometrics-based SIP authentication scheme. Security 
analysis and formal verification are given in “Security analysis and formal verification” 
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section. “Security and performance comparisons” section compares the security and 
performance of our protocol to existing ones, and we conclude the paper in “Conclu-
sions” section.
Biometrics‑based SIP authentication scheme
A biometrics based SIP authentication scheme is proposed in this section, which con-
sists of three phases: registration, login and authentication, and password change. In 
this section, we first describe the construction of the fuzzy extractor, then we give the 
scheme specification of the proposed biometrics based SIP.
Fuzzy extractor
Fuzzy extractor contains a pair of randomized procedures 〈“generate” (Gen), “repro-
duce” (Rep)〉. The procedure Gen is designed for inputting users’ biometrics BIO, and 
then outputting a random and uniform string η as secret information as well as a ran-
dom auxiliary string  as public information, namely, Gen(BIO) = (η, ). The procedure 
Rep takes the biometrics BIO∗ and the auxiliary string  as inputs. Even if the inputted 
BIO∗ has slightly difference with BIO, as long as the difference is less than the threshold, 
the procedure Rep will generate the same string η, namely, Rep(BIO∗, ) = η. Though we 
cannot always get the same biometrics due to the impact of noisy data when sampling, 
fuzzy extractor can overcome this problem. Readers may refer to Dodis et  al. (2004), 
Yang and Yang (2009) for the detailed introduction of fuzzy extractor. The notations 
used in this paper are given in Table 1.
Registration
A legal user Ui must register in the remote server S beforehand by performing the fol-
lowing steps, as shown in Algorithm 1.
Step 1.  The user Ui chooses a password pwi, a random number ai ∈ Z∗n, computes 
M = h(ai�pwi ) and sends the register message {IDi,M} to S via a secure 
channel.
Step 2.  After S receives the register request message {IDi,M}, S computes 
R = M ⊕ h(IDi�x ), stores R into a smart card and sends it to Ui through a 
secure channel.
Table 1 The notations
Notation Description
E An elliptic curve with large order n
P A generator on E with large order n
Ui The user Ui
BIOi The user Ui’s biometrics
IDi The user Ui’s identity
pwi The user Ui’s password
S The server S
x The server S’s secret key
h() A secure one-way hash function‖ A string concatenation operation
⊕ A exclusive-or(XOR) operation
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Step 3.  After Ui obtains the smart card, he or she enters his or her biometrics 
BIOi on a specific device and computes Gen(BIOi) = (η, ), B = ai ⊕ h(η), 
C = h(IDi�pwi�ai) and stores B, C and λ into the smart card. Thus, the smart 
card contains {B,C , ,R}. 
Algorithm 1  Registration Phase
Login and authentication
In this phase, Ui and S can be authenticated by each other and establish the session key. 
The process is shown in Algorithm 2.
Step 1.  The user Ui inserts his or her smart card into a card reader, inputs his or her 
identity IDi and password pwi, and enters biometrics BIO∗i . The smart card 
selects a random number b ∈ Z∗n, computes Rep(BIO∗i ,) = η, ai = B⊕ h(η) , 
and C ′ = h(IDi�pwi�ai). Then, the smart card checks whether C ′ is equal 
to C. If they are not equal, the protocol is terminated; otherwise, compute 
D = bP, D′ = R⊕ h(ai�pwi) = h(IDi�x) and F = h(IDi�D�D′). At last, Ui 
sends the message REQUEST {IDi,D, F} to S.
Step 2.  When the server S receives REQUEST {IDi,D, F}, S computes 
D′′ = h(IDi�x ) and checks if F  and h(IDi�D�D′′) are equal. If they are not 
equal, S rejects the request; otherwise, S randomly chooses two num-
bers u, t ∈ Z∗n, computes H  =  uP, K = u · h(IDi�x)D, SK = h(IDi�t�K ) 










, he or she 
computes K = bD′H and SK = h(IDi�t�K ). Then Ui checks if Auths and 
h(D�K�D′�t�SK�H ) are equal. Ui terminates the protocol if they are not 
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Algorithm 2 Login and Authentication Phase
Password change
The user Ui inserts his or her smart card into a terminal, inputs his IDi, old password pwi, 
new password pwnewi , chooses a random number anewi ∈ Z∗n and enters biom-
etrics BIO∗i  on a specific device. Then the smart card computes Rep(BIO∗i  ,) = η, 
ai = B⊕ h(η). After this, the smart card verifies h(IDi�pwi�ai) = C. If it does 













), and replaces (R,B,C) with (Rnew ,Bnew ,Cnew).
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Security analysis and formal verification
In this section, we will analyze the security of the proposed scheme.
Formal verification
In order to prove the security of cryptographic protocols, there are some available for-
mal verification tools, such as BAN logic (Burrows et al. 1989), AVISPA (Armando et al. 
2005) and ProVerif. In this section, we prove secrecy and authentication using ProVerif, 
because it is performed automatically and efficiently, and can detect errors easily. Pro-
Verif makes use of Dolev-Yao model (Dolev and Yao 1983) and supports many crypto-
graphic primitives, including digital signature, symmetric and asymmetric encryption, 
hash function, and so on.
There’re two types of channels in the formal model: a public channel for transmitting 
general protocol messages and private channel for transmitting smart card data between 
user and his smart card. The definition of these channels is given as below:
free cch: channel.
free sch: channel [private].





free SK’: bitstring [private].
free SK: bitstring [private].
The functions used in the protocol are defined as follows:
fun sco(bitstring, bitstring): bitstring.
fun Gen(bitstring): bitstring.
fun Rep(bitstring, bitstring): bitstring.
fun xor(bitstring, bitstring): bitstring.
fun mult(bitstring, bitstring): bitstring.
fun h(bitstring): bitstring.
Function sco, xor, mult, h represent bound symbol, exclusive or operation, scalar 
multiplication and hash function in the protocol, and function Gen and Rep are fuzzy 
extractor algorithms. The algebraic properties of these functions are modeled as the fol-
lowing equation and reduction:
equation forall m: bitstring, n: bitstring; xor(xor(m, n), n) = m.
In order to prove authentication, two events are defined as follows:
event UserAuthed(bitstring).
event UserStarted(bitstring).
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The process part defines the action of participants and models the protocol as the par-
allel executions of them. According to the protocol, the following is the core message 
sequence for our protocol:
Message 1: User Ui  → Server S: REQUEST {IDi,D, F}








The actions of user Ui are composed of computing and then sending message 1 to S, 
waiting until he or she receives message 2 from S, computing and sending message 3 to 
S. We define user Ui as below:
let U_i = 
new a_i: bitstring;
new ID_i: bitstring;
let M = h(sco(a_i, pw_i)) in
out(sch,(ID_i, M));
in(sch, xR: bitstring);
let (r: bitstring, s: bitstring) = Gen(BIO_i) in
let B = xor(a_i, h(r)) in






let r' = Rep(BIO_i', s) in
let a_i' = xor(B,h(r')) in
let C' = h(sco(ID_i, sco(pw_i, a_i))) in
if C' = C then
let D = mult(b, P) in
let D' = xor(xR, h(sco(a_i, pw_i))) in
let F = h(sco(ID_i, sco(D, D'))) in
out(cch, (ID_i, D, F));
in (cch, (realm': bitstring, Auth_s': bitstring, H': bitstring, t': bitstring));
let K' = mult(b, mult(D', H')) in
let SK' = h(sco(ID_i, sco(t', K'))) in
let xAuth_s = h(sco(D, sco(K', sco(D', sco(t', sco(SK', H')))))) in
if xAuth_s = Auth_s' then
let Auth_u = h(sco(ID_i, sco(realm', sco(K', sco(D', sco(t', sco(SK', sco(H', D)))))))) in
out(cch, (ID_i, realm', Auth_u))
).
The actions of the server S are composed of receiving message 1 from Ui, computing 
and sending message 2 to Ui, waiting until he receives message 3 from Ui, and then veri-
fying the message 3. We define the server as below:
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).
let S = 
in(sch, (xID_i: bitstring, xM: bitstring));




in(cch, (ID_i': bitstring, xD: bitstring, F': bitstring));
let D'' = h(sco(ID_i', x)) in
let xF = h(sco(ID_i',sco(xD,D''))) in




let H = mult(u, P) in
let K = mult(u,mult(D'',xD)) in
let SK = h(sco(ID_i', sco(t, K))) in
let Auth_s = h(sco(xD, sco(K, sco(D'', sco(t, sco(SK, H)))))) in
out(cch, (realm, Auth_s, H, t)); 




The protocol is defined as the parallel executions of the two participants:
process !U_i| S
In order to verify mutual authentication and the session key security, we define the 
following queries for checking the events’ correspondence and the attacker queries 
respectively:
query id: bitstring; inj-event(UserAuthed(id)) ==> inj-event(UserStarted(id)).
query attacker(SK).
query attacker(SK’).
The above code is performed in the latest version 1.90 of ProVerif to show that the cor-
respondence query is true and the two attacker queries are not true. That is, the authen-
tication property and security are satisfied, referring to the Fig. 1.
Security analysis
Session key security
Due to the impossibility of solving the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, 
an adversary can neither know h(IDi‖x ) nor compute ubP from bP and uP. That is, the 
adversary cannot compute the session key SK = h(IDi�t�uh(IDi�x )bP).
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Mutual authentication
The user Ui and the server S can authenticate each other by checking the correctness of 
F, Authu and Auths, respectively. Without the knowledge of h(IDi‖x ), no one except the 
user and the server can compute Authu and Auths.
Replay attack
An adversary may intercept the request message REQUEST {IDi,D, F} and replay to the 
server, where D = bP, D′ = h(IDi�x ) and F = h(IDi�D�D′). Without the knowledge of b, 









. Then the server 
could detect the attack by checking the correctness of Authu. On the other hand, the 





replay it to the user, where K = uh(IDi�x )D and Auths = h(D�K�D′′�t�SK�H ). As the 
user generates a new D = bP for each session, the attack can be detected by checking 
the correctness of Auths. Therefore, proposed SIP authentication scheme can resist the 
replay attack.
Off‑line password guessing attack
Suppose that the adversary gets the data {B,C , ,R}, where B = ai ⊕ h(η) , 




∥x). He could also eavesdrop 









 transmitted between Ui and S. The adversary may guess 
a password pw∗i , but without the knowledge of S’s secret key x, he or she can neither 
compute the random number ai nor verify if his guessed password is correct or not. 
Hence, our scheme can resist the off-line password guessing attack.
For similar reasons, our protocol can resist smart card stolen attacks.
Privileged insider attack
In the registration phase of our scheme, Ui chooses the random number ai, the password 
pwi, and computes the hash value h(ai‖pwi ). Then Ui sends the hash value to S. The 
privileged insider can’t get pwi as it is protected by the random number ai and the secure 
hash function.
Fig. 1 Verification result of the protocol
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Impersonation attack





, where Auths = h(D�K�D′′�t�SK�H ) 





Note that all messages are transmitted via a secure channel in registration phase, which 
are supposed to be free of corruption. So our scheme could withstand the impersonation 
attack.
Stolen‑verifier attack
In the proposed scheme, S only needs to keep its key x secret. No password-verifier table 
is required to be stored in the server’s database. Therefore, our scheme can resist the 
stolen-verifier attack.
Man‑in‑the‑middle attack
From the above security analysis, we know that our scheme could provide mutual 
authentication between Ui and S, and can resist off-line password guessing attack and 
impersonation attack. Hence, our scheme is secure against the man-in-the-middle 
attack.
Perfect forward secrecy
In our protocol, the session key is SK = h(IDi�t�uh(IDi�x )bP), even if an adversary cor-
rupts all secret parameters such as S’s secret key x and Ui’s password pwi, he or she still 
cannot compute uh(IDi‖x )bP from bP and uP due to the intractability of CDH problem. 
Therefore, the introduced scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy.
Security and performance comparisons
Security and computation cost comparison
The security and computation cost comparisons between the proposed scheme and 
some related schemes (Zhang et al. 2014; Tu et al. 2015; Irshad et al. 2015; Arshad and 
Nikooghadam 2016; Farash 2016; Mishra et al. 2016; Chaudhry et al. 2015a; Wu et al. 
2015) are given in Tables 2 and 3. For convenience, some notations are defined as fol-
lows: SY, H, MI, SM and PA are the operation times of a symmetric key encryption or 
decryption, hash function, modular inversion, scalar multiplication and point addition 
over elliptic curve, respectively.
Very recently, Kilinc and Yanik (2014) have estimated the complexity of various cryp-
tographic operations by using the PBC library. The actual execution time for the above 
notations of operations are as follows: SY is about 0.0046 ms, H is about 0.0023 ms, MI is 
about 0.0056 ms (Koblitz et al. 2000), SM is about 2.226 ms, PA is about 0.0288 ms.
From Tables  2 and 3, we can conclude that our scheme enjoys better security than 
others, and higher efficiency than other related schemes except Mishra et al.’s protocol 
(Chaudhry et al. 2015a). Unfortunately, Mishra et al.’s protocol cannot provide perfect 





∥∥username�N )�|mk · uP)x�T2�T3
)
,
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where mk is the secret key of the server S, T2 and T3 are timestamps, u is nonce chosen 
by the user and N  is registration sign. According to the definition of perfect forward 
secrecy, if an attacker can know the secret key mk of S then he or she can compute the 
Table 2 Security comparison
Y the scheme can resist this attack or provide this property



























Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Replay 
attack































Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Table 3 Computation cost comparison
RP registration phase, LAAP login and authentication phase, PCP password change phase, TC total computation, AT actual 
time
Schemes RP LAAP PCP TC AT (ms)
Zhang et al. (2014) 1SM + 2H 8SM + 2PA + 11H 1SM + 4SY + 6H 10SM + 2PA + 4SY + 19H 22.3797
Tu et al. (2015) 1SM + 2H 7SM + 1PA + 10H 1SM + 4SY + 6H 9SM + 1PA + 4SY + 18H 20.1226
Irshad et al. (2015) 1SM + 2H 7SM + 12H 1SM + 4SY + 6H 9SM + 4SY + 20H 20.0984
Arshad and Nikoogh-
adam (2016)
2H 4SM + 8H + 1MI 9H 4SM + 19H + 1MI 8.9533
Farash (2016) 1SM + 2H 7SM + 1PA + 10H 1SM + 4SY + 6H 9SM + 1PA + 4SY + 18H 20.1226
Mishra et al. (2016) 4H 3SM + 12H 6H 3SM + 22H 7.184
Chaudhry et al. (2015a) 3H 6SM + 7H 3H 6SM + 13H 13.3859
Wu et al. (2015) 4H 4SM + 4SY + 12H 4H 4SM + 4SY + 20H 8.9684
Our scheme 4H 4SM + 12H 5H 4SM + 21H 8.9523
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session key SK . Generally, we can use Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm to achieve 
perfect forward secrecy, but it needs more scalar multiplication operations over elliptic 
curve.
Storage capacity comparison
Since the proposed protocol is developed for applications using smart card, the mem-
ory requirement is a key parameter in concern. Therefore, we have also compared the 
storage capacity of our scheme with other related schemes (Zhang et al. 2014; Tu et al. 
2015; Irshad et al. 2015; Arshad and Nikooghadam 2016; Farash 2016; Mishra et al. 2016; 
Chaudhry et al. 2015a; Wu et al. 2015). We assume that hash function outputs 256 bits, 
the size of a point on elliptic curve is 164 bits, the length of a random nonce is 128 bits, 
and the length of an identity is 128 bits. In the proposed scheme, the smart card needs 
to store {B,C , ,R} which is 256 + 256 + 128 + 256 = 896 bits. The storage capacities 
of other relevant schemes have been shown in Table 4, which shows that the memory of 
smart cards needed in all schemes are less than 1 k bit.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient biometrics-based SIP authentication 
scheme. We apply formal verification tools and security analysis against various attacks 
to show that our proposed scheme achieves both security and authentication. Moreover, 
the performance evaluation validates that our scheme has very high efficiency in com-
parison to other related schemes.
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